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REPLY
RENT CONTROL REVISITED: ONE REPLY TO
SEVEN CRITICS
Richard A. Epstein*
The appearance of these seven short Responses to my Arti-
cle Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation1 is am-
ple testimony to the hackles that an attack on rent control
raises, not only for lawyers, but for philosophers and economists
as well. The uniform barrage of criticism found in these com-
ments is in sharp contrast to the sympathetic reception that I
received from Professor Salins in his earlier comment published
along with the original article.' Given the vehemence of some of
these attacks, I take comfort that majority rule has no place in
academic discourse. I think that all these criticisms miss the
mark. In this short reply I take issue with the most insistent of
the points. However, silence on any question should not be
taken as a sign of assent, but only as evidence of the shortness of
time.
In this reply I propose to examine the criticisms by order of
their subject matter: philosophy, law, and economics. In the first
part, I hope to show that there are no hidden philosophical traps
which undermine the proposition that all forms of rent control
are per se unconstitutional as an undercompensated taking of
property. In the second, I examine the legal objections to my
position and conclude that the normative soundness of my legal
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
Columbia College, A.B., 1964; Oxford University, B.A., 1966; Yale Law School, LL.B.,
1968.
' Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROoKLYN L.
REV. 741 (1988).
' Salins, Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOKLYN L. REV. 775 (1988).
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analysis is not undermined by the long line of cases that take
the opposite position. In the third section, I shall show that the
defense of rent stabilization offered in the comments only prove
that it is a lesser evil than the more rigid forms of rent control
that were in place, for example, in New York City before 1969 -
yes, when I was a student at Columbia College.
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR BECKER
The burden of Professor Becker's Response Rent Control is
Not a Taking3 is that my accounts of ordinary ownership are far
too naive. The fee simple absolute in possession of the common
law was neither simple nor absolute. In his view, ownership
rights are conditioned in three important ways. The first two are
straightforward enough. Property cannot be used to cause a nui-
sance against neighbors; and it is liable to be seized for the non-
payment of the debts. So far so good. His third qualification,
however, gives away the game. Built into the idea of ownership
itself are "reasonably expectable sorts of restrictions, even if
they are inconvenient, offensive, or surprising to the people who
suffer them."'4 These restrictions are no more beyond the power
of the state to impose than ordinary taxes, which may be in-
creased or decreased by the sovereign. Starting from these prem-
ises, Professor Becker then concludes that rent control falls
within this last class of restrictions. He is wrong.
To see why, it is important to take Professor Becker's three
limitations separately. Everyone agrees that police power limita-
tion on the rights of private property extend to all these nui-
sance cases. Wholly outside the context of eminent domain, the
ordinary rights of ownership require all persons to respect their
neighbor's property. The tort of nuisance is of ancient origin,
and is a necessary part of any libertarian theory, and, hence,
consistent with my views. It hardly seems odd that the state can
enforce these restrictions by direct control.5 Similarly, it is com-
monplace that people ought to honor their promises and pay
3 Becker, Rent Control is Not a Taking, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1215 (1989).
4 Id. at 1216.
5 The extensive treatment that I give to the police power in Takings shows how well
this point fits in with the theory that Becker attacks. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN chs. 9 & 10 (1985) (discussing the ends
and means questions of the police power).
[Vol. 54:1281
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their debts. If they do not, some remedy must be awarded
against them. If parties in breach can be compelled to pay dam-
ages, then surely their property can be seized and sold to satisfy
any valid claims. A strong libertarian account of private prop-
erty necessarily entails this limitation on ownership as well.
So everything turns on the status of Becker's proposed third
class of limitations. Initially, it is quite clear that this class dif-
fers radically from the first two because it allows the state to
impose restrictions upon private ownership when the property
owner has neither committed a tort nor acted in breach of con-
tract-that is, when the propoerty owner has done no wrong. No
longer can the property owner insulate himself from government
regulation by the way he orders his own conduct. With its power
to initiate, not only to respond, there is a great risk of official
overreaching. Surely there must be some limitation on the state
power to so act, for otherwise the endless restrictions that gov-
ernment piles on can wipe out the property altogether. Professor
Becker acknowledges this simple point when he recognizes that
the government does not have carte blanche in regulation if
there is to be anything left of the idea of private property for the
Constitution to protect. A naive positive account, that property
is what the state says it is, will hardly do to limit the ability of
the state to take the property it is obliged to protect.
Professor Becker, however, provides no theory as to what
those limits on the state might be. His own formulation of "rea-
sonably expectable restrictions" is perfectly useless. If we know
what the legal restraints are, then we know what can be reasona-
bly expected. We cannot, therefore, use the idea of reasonable
expectations to determine the content of the legal restraints.
You can pick your metaphor. Professor Becker either reasons in
a circle or hoists himself by his own bootstraps. But either way
he fails both as philosopher and lawyer.
So where else could we look in principle? Here it is useful to
go to the just compensation requirement found in the eminent
domain clause. The test here says that the government can im-
pose restrictions on parties (where nuisances are not involved)
only if the party so restricted receives just compensation for the
restrictions, partial takings all, that the state wants to impose.
The test here accounts for the taxes that Professor Becker finds
1989]
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so mysterious. The public services provided by the taxes are the
compensation for the property so taken. It also explains why
simple increases and decreases in the general tax level are not
regarded as compensable takings. As the taxes increase, the ben-
efits the state provides can increase as well, so that the property
taken and the benefits provided are kept in rough lockstep. The
key question, therefore, is how we can be sure that benefits and
burdens match, for otherwise, as Professor Becker acknowledges,
taxes can work disguised confiscation: how else would you de-
scribe a tax of 100 percent selectively imposed on a tiny fraction
of landowners? But once taxes are not selective, then the power
of abuse is effectively controlled, and it can be shown that peo-
ple only have incentive to vote for those taxes which provide
them with a net benefit, satisfying the just compensation
criterion.7
This just compensation criterion is not satisfied, however, in
the rent control case, even with systems of rent stabilization.
Property with a rental value of X is taken by the state for a
limited period of time for a rent of pX, with p < 1. The land-
lord is not provided with a just equivalent to the term of years
that he has lost. The connection to the question of social ineffi-
ciency quickly follows. The rent regulation is not Pareto efficient
because someone has been made worse off by the social initia-
tive. It is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient because the total social
losses from the system necessarily mean that the tenants under
rent control could not compensate the landlords for their losses
and still remain better off. I have not simply asserted that the
Constitution allows only efficient forms of regulation. I have
shown how that conclusion follows given that the rent control
regulation is a taking, namely of the term of years, for which just
compensation has not, and could not be, provided. Professor
Becker has no theory to explain what counts as property, as a
taking of property, or as a standard of just compensation. Vague
talk of reasonable expectations does not even explain why courts
today should require constitutionally that the landlord be al-
lowed to recover his initial purchase price and operating costs
under rent stabilization. After all, it is offensive but hardly sur-
prising to see the legislature pass more Draconian rent control
6 Becker, supra note 3, at 1216-17.
7 For greater elaboration, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, ch. 14.
[Vol. 54: 1281
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systems. Professor Becker's amorphous tests cannot even ac-
count for the limited protection that landlords receive under
current law.
Professor Becker wants his reader to believe that his rich,
multilayer account of property is a sign of intellectual strength
and philosophical sophistication. But it is neither. In effect Pro-
fessor Becker occupies that happy, carefree land in which it is
possible to reach and justify any conclusion simply by changing
the weights that he attaches to the endless array of moral or
social factors that are said to be always relevant, but never deci-
sive, to the idea of property. To make the point formally, the
decision whether compensation is owing is a yes/no decision, for
which there must be some yes/no decision function. But that is
not possible to structure under Professor Becker's approach. In
essence, if there is some decision threshold, T, he tells us that
we cross that threshold if aX + bY> T, where X is (say) effi-
ciency and Y is community justice. Equations of that sort are
tractable if we know in advance the weight of a and b, but that
is exactly the information that Professor Becker's ecumenical
approach denies us. His formula, therefore, admits any answer
in any particular case, even where there are but two relevant
variables. Matters do not get better when there are three or
more. Professor Becker has tempted us with at least two criteria,
perhaps more. But he has provided us with none.
II. THE LAWYERS
Turning to the lawyers, W. Dennis Keating's Response of-
fers a set of far less abstract criticisms of my position.8 At times
he is quite content to assert that my view must be wrong be-
cause it has been rejected by every court, state and federal, that
has examined the question. Alas, he has offered us an accurate
description of the current consensus of the law, which I have
never disputed. But the burden of my argument was normative,
not descriptive. In light of the overwhelming case law on his
side, one might think that he could easily offer some good rea-
sons why the present universal position is also the sound one.
But he makes no argument that carries any independent social
' Keating, Commentary on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROoKLYN L. REV. 1223 (1989).
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weight. He is correct to note that the police power must be read
into the Constitution, but nowhere explains why the protection
of private property simultaneously has to be read out of it. He
rests on the familiar distinction between "the legitimate exercise
of the police power and a regulatory taking,"9 but like countless
numbers of frustrated scholars before him, he gives no clue on
how to draw it. Rather he concludes that indeed he agrees with
me that "rent control should be subject to the democratic pro-
cess,"'1 but misunderstands the importance of my remark. The
democratic process is prey to special interest domination when
the power to enact a law is divorced from the responsibility for
its consequences. I suggested that the democratic process could
work only if the state were required to pay landlords the differ-
ence between contract and market if they chose to regulate the
rental price of the units, confident that no electoral majority
would be prepared to put its money where its mouth was. Mr.
Keating seems to think that any electoral majority is good
enough, even if the voters who benefit are local, while the land-
lords and prospective tenants who bear the costs are out-of-
town. As I pointed out in my earlier piece, rent control is not
simply a price control scheme that preserves the landlord's right
to select his own tenant subject to an external price constraint.1
It is a system of enforced occupation that allows the voters who
pass the legislation to reap its benefit.
If his brief legal analysis is impoverished, his economic anal-
ysis is more so. Keating at one point claims competition in real
estate markets is nonexistent but fails to note that the rigidity
of prices is a product of the rent control (or stabilization) legisla-
tion that he defends and I deplore.'" If the prices could move
freely, then we should quickly see the forms of competition
found even in Chicago, where in slack times tenants often get
substantial concessions, including a free month's rent or special
repairs. But prices will not move if legislation keeps them con-
sistently below market. All competition requires is many buyers
and many sellers in a market of free entry. Housing rental mar-
kets easily satisfy that definition.
9 Id. at 1223.
10 Id. at 1230.
'1 Epstein, supra note 1, at 757.
12 See Keating, supra note 8, at 1226.
[Vol. 54: 1281
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Keating's confusion also misfires in his analysis of vacancy
decontrol. He notes that it does not work well because it "en-
courages landlords to harass tenants into vacating the apartment
so it can be rerented at market rents."13 This argument does not
demonstrate the necessity of rent control, but only that it is not
possible to run a well-functioning two-tier market, with some
deregulated and some regulated units. The thesis of my Article
was not that landlords were saints and tenants were sinners.
Quite the opposite, it was that the power of self-interest works
its magic on both sides of the rental market. The existence of a
two-tier market is an incurable lure to the landlord to take
steps, fair or foul, to decontrol the unit, just as it is for the ten-
ant to use any number of shameless stratagems to trap the land-
lord for technical violations of the statutes or to contrive to pass
the unit secretly on to family and friends. My charge is that rent
control undermines incentives for decent behavior on both sides
of the market. Mr. Keating seems to think that the distorted
problems of mobility should be tolerated to end the harassment.
But a thoroughgoing system of deregulation eliminates both
problems simultaneously. Why choose between them?
Finally, Mr. Keating notes that many problems of obtaining
affordable housing preceded rent control and exist indepen-
dently of it. He is clearly correct. Outmoded building codes in
Chicago, for example, add thousands of unnecessary dollars to
the construction of new homes and apartments. Zoning restric-
tions prevent the development of cheap housing in desirable
neighborhoods. What is needed is a set of constitutional rules
that attack these vicious practices as well. We should never suc-
cumb to the temptation to use one mindless system of local reg-
ulation to justify another system, equally mindless. Rent control
is not a response, let alone a just response, to the housing
shortage; it is one of its important causes. Mr. Keating's short
piece is little more than a vivid reminder of the intellectual pov-
erty of the current arguments in favor of rent control.
Mr. Kenneth Baar's Response follows down the path set by
Mr. Keating's. 14 Essentially he develops two points. The first is
that there is no solid evidence that the rent control laws, which
11 Id. at 1227.
'4 Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore a Free Market?, 54 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 1231 (1989).
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typically contain an exemption for new construction, slow the
construction of new rental housing. His second point (also made
by Mr. Keating) is that the repeal or invalidation of the rent
control laws will not return us to some competitive utopia given
the extensive restrictions on entry that are posed by restrictive
zoning ordinances and building codes. In making these points,
Mr. Baar has conceded the force of most of the practical and
constitutional arguments that I have made against all forms of
rent control statutes. He does not attempt to show in any way
how the rent control laws would, or could, improve matters in a
first-best world. All of the distortions and inequities that the
rent control laws create with respect to the stock of existing
housing are left unexamined and undefended. The destructive
behaviors that these statutes invite from both landlord and ten-
ant are either tolerated or ignored, and no account is taken of
the administrative costs and fractional strife engendered by any
system of rent control. Likewise on the constitutional front, he
does not address the question of whether rent control is an un-
justified and uncompensated taking of the landlord's reversion.
Even if Mr. Baar's two-point attack had its maximum in-
tended impact, we should still be better off without rent control
laws than with them. And we should still strike them down on
constitutional grounds. But even on his own chosen grounds, he
should find no solace. Mr. Baar misunderstands the social signif-
icance of both his arguments.
On the question of new construction, Mr. Baar offers no
theory to explain either of two key points. First, why do the rent
control statutes contain an exception for new construction? Sec-
ond, what is the relationship between that exemption and the
predicted levels of new rental construction?
To begin with the first point, there are good self-interested
reasons why local rent control statutes often exempt new con-
struction. The local political interests implicitly but unmistaka-
bly accept the proposition that changes in legal rules have strong
effects upon investment behavior, just as ordinary economic the-
ory insists. If the new construction were subject to the rent con-
trol rules, then quite simply it would not be built, at least if the
projected regulated rental rates give a return on capital insuffi-
cient to compensate landlords for their risky ventures. But the
want of new construction is not an unmixed blessing for estab-
lished political interests or sitting tenants. Local governments
[Vol. 54: 1281
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need to expand their rate base, and tenants in existing units are
not likely to complain if new tenants shoulder a heavier portion
of their local expenses through real estate taxes that are them-
selves tied to market value. So there should be ample political
support for the exemption.
More importantly, given that the rent control laws are in
place for existing housing, what should we expect the effect to be
on the rate of construction for exempt housing? Mr. Baar does
not address this question, and the answer is quite tricky. One
key variable is the likelihood that the exemption from rent con-
trol will remain in place when today's new construction becomes
tomorrow's existing stock of housing. If the political situation
were such that present landlords think it likely that today's new
construction will remain outside the orbit of rent control, then
they are more likely to build. Not only will they receive the nor-
mal competitive rate of return, but they will benefit as well from
the pent-up demand created by the inefficient deployment of ex-
isting housing under the rent control laws. Rent control com-
monly induces people to stay put in apartments that are larger
than they need: who would leave rent controlled housing to pay
more money for less space on the open market? The existing
stock of housing, therefore, will not be put to its optimal use,
but will instead contain too few people. That excess population
is driven into the new unregulated market, where the demand
increases above the levels it would reach if all rent regulations
were removed from the existing stock of housing.
Important conclusions quickly follow. If there were perfect
confidence that the rent control laws would not be extended to
today's new housing, then we should have somewhat greater new
construction given rent control than there is without it. The sit-
uation only changes incrementally if there is some positive
probability that today's new housing will be subject to future
rent restrictions. If that probability is low, and if the anticipated
restrictions are relatively modest, then the short-term gain avail-
able to new construction may be sufficient to offset the long-
term losses that the landlord will suffer when regulation does
come.
We should expect, therefore, the rate of new construction to
be a function of both the present exemption and the lurking re-
strictions. The two effects work in opposite directions. The for-
mer promises a supercompetitive return, while the latter threat-
1989]
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ens a subcompetitive return. If the former effect dominates, then
we should expect to see more new housing than in a competitive
market. If the latter effect dominates, we should expect to see
less. There is no reason to believe that these two effects will
have the same weight in all local settings, for the constellation of
political forces varies widely across municipal governments. We
should, therefore, expect to find exactly the type of scattered
and inconclusive empirical results that Mr. Baar reports in his
paper. 15 In some cases there is much new construction, in others
there is less.
To make this empirical point count as an argument in favor
of rent control law, however, it is crucial to show the linkage
between the rate of new construction and the overall efficiency
of the housing market. That step Mr. Baar is unable to take.
The fatal flaw in his argument is that he cannot identify the
optimal level of new construction. But if what is said is correct,
the inequities and the distortions within the regulated market
intrude in the unregulated market as well. If new construction is
booming, it may well represent a significant social overinvest-
ment in unnecessary new construction. People would not have to
make wasteful investments in new housing if the existing hous-
ing were better deployed. If new construction is slack, then the
opposite point now becomes plausible. The threat of further reg-
ulation has dulled the incentives to construct new housing. It is
thus a singular feature of the rent control laws that they are
consistent with both forms of misallocation - too little and too
much - in the new construction market.
To make matters worse, it is often very difficult to find the
proper baseline against which under- or overinvestment should
be measured. One standard practice in the studies referred to by
Mr. Baar is to compare the rate of new construction in neighbor-
ing communities, some of which have rent control ordinances
and others which do not.16 However, that experiment is dogged
with the obvious difficulty that in today's environment the
threat of rent control is present even in communities that have
no statute on the books. Hence, it is quite possible that the risk
of future regulation is greater in a community with no rent con-
trol ordinance than in one with an existing rent control ordi-
15 See generally id. at 1232-34 & nn. 5-15; 1236-37.
le Id. at 1232-33.
[Vol. 54: 1281
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nance that is coupled with an exemption for new housing.
Therefore, one strong reason to ban rent control at a constitu-
tional level is to remove the uncertainty that otherwise will de-
press real estate values systematically, even in communities
without rent control. The inconclusive empirical findings on new
construction are no source of relief to Mr. Baar. They are per-
fectly consistent with the mischievous operation of the rent con-
trol laws.
Mr. Baar's second point fares no better than his first. His
argument, which echoes Mr. Keating's, is that the repeal or in-
validation of the rent control laws will not return us to a com-
petitive utopia. The existence of strict zoning requirements and
onerous building codes are two major obstacles that remain in
our path. Yet again Mr. Baar does not tell us what to make of
the imperfections that remain. In an ideal world, I think that
these restrictions should be subject to the same type of scrutiny
that is applicable to any taking of property, including rights of
development and sale. The state should have to show that the
restriction redounds to the benefit of the party on whom it is
imposed, or it should show that it is reasonably necessary to pre-
vent a common-law nuisance or other tort to neighbors.1" Most
zoning and building code restrictions in place today do not come
within shouting distance of these tests. I should hope that Mr.
Baar would join me in the effort to persuade the Supreme Court
to cut back on its unfortunate decision in Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co.,'8 the misguided fons et origio of the present law.
Mr. Baar has no real willingness to join in yet another hope-
less crusade,19 although I detect, perhaps optimistically, that he
has at least some unspoken sympathy with my position. Rather,
his point is to argue that so long as Euclid is on the books, one
should be indifferent to whether rent control stays or goes. But
he is mistaken on several counts. First, while Euclid type restric-
tions abound, they are not everywhere. At a guess, there are
some communities in which rent control poses a greater threat
to markets than zoning. That is surely the case whenever the
rent control laws distort the use of an existing stock of housing
that has already hurdled the zoning obstacles. Zoning laws have
17 See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, chs. 9, 10 & 14.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See Baar, supra note 14, at 1238.
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little effect where apartment houses and six-flats have been con-
structed. It follows that there are many situations in which zon-
ing is not a factor, even though rent control may well be.
Second, Mr. Baar is wrong even in those cases in which the
rent control statutes and zoning ordinances cover much the
same turf. To use a homely example, suppose that one person
has been hit with a hard blow to the solar plexus. It is hardly a
reason to hit him over the head with a candlestick. The two sets
of restrictions bind more tightly than the one because they in-
crease the costs of doing business and restrict the alternatives
that are otherwise available for both landlords and tenants. Zon-
ing and building code restrictions are usually misguided, and
their bad effects are only compounded if they are allowed to jus-
tify further unwise social legislation. Indeed, Mr. Baar's position
is the counsel of despair. Once there is a single bad piece of leg-
islation on the books, we shouldn't care whether other bad stat-
utes are added to the public rolls. But the right response is to
limit the damage of poor legislation, not to magnify it. Mr.
Baar's position is a recipe for turning bad legislation into worse
legislation. We get far better results from a system that treats
each legislative proposal on its own independent merits. If rent
control is unwise and unconstitutional, it does not become wise
or constitutional because zoning ordinances and building codes
are still on the books.
Professor Curtis Berger's Home is Where the Heart Is: A
Brief Reply to Professor Epstein20 suggests a possible title for a
bad sitcom about the perils of living in New York. But once we
read past the title, his remarks are best understood as a living
testament to the power of misguided forces of self-interest that
work overtime to keep all forms of rent control in place. Profes-
sor Berger is a beneficiary of rent stabilization and proud of it.
He notes that his situation is indeed different from mine,21 and
so it is. The windfall I received lasted only twelve months and
was probably worth in total under $1,000. Professor Berger an-
nounces that he has rent at over $1,000 per month below mar-
ket,22 in perpetuity, which works out to a transfer of over
20 Berger, Home is Where the Heart Is: A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54
BRO KLYN L. REV. 1239 (1989).
21 Id. at 1239.
22 Id. ie. Id. & n.3.
[Vol. 54:1281
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$100,000 in long term capital value, even if rent stabilization
does nothing to increase the gap between contract and market
over the time. It is worth reciting a large amount of communi-
tarian cant for that kind of money. And Professor Berger is
equal to the challenge. Anonymity among apartment dwellers is
doubtless the rule in New York, as it is in other large and imper-
sonal cities. So neighborliness then is not the issue. Money is.
There are few persons who are less entitled to generous subsidies
then the fortunate professionals who have locked themselves
into powerful positions under rent stabilization. Professor Ber-
ger may wax eloquent about his own connections with his apart-
ment, and he may deplore his landlord's connection as merely
"financial." But the landlord could use the money to the same
ends as Professor Berger, so long as he has hospital bills to pay,
children to educate, and vacations to take. The private battle is
over money. But here the case for competition shows that the
total social product is higher if Professor Berger loses. New en-
try will quickly compete away any supracompetitive returns the
landlord will receive unless present landlords and tenants con-
spire together to pass laws that prevent new construction in
"their" neighborhoods.
Professor Berger, however, is oblivious to the allocative
losses of rent control. Rather he dresses up his plea to self-inter-
est with an account of the tenant who longs for the same level of
security that the homeowner receives. But while he recognizes
the obvious objection - let him buy long-term ownership23 -
he does not come close to answering it. So long as the market is
well functioning, then persons who desire to have long-term at-
tachments to property can buy instead of rent. But the decision
to buy or rent is far more complicated than Professor Berger's
inaccurate sketch of the alternatives indicates. To be sure, the
owner normally builds up an equity in the property that the ten-
ant does not. But presumably he has to pay something for this
privilege; otherwise, the market would not be in equilibrium,
given that homeownership would always be a better buy (at the
same price) than rental property. The point missing from Ber-
ger's analysis involves the fate of that difference. Since the ten-
ant pays less to rent, he can engage in a program of diversified
23 Id. at 1241.
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saving and investment with the money left over. The tenant may
have no equity, but he has a larger bank account or stock portfo-
lio, and is probably in a stronger financial position than the
homeowner, a large fraction of whose wealth is tied up in a sin-
gle asset. We therefore should expect to find a sensible sorting
equilibrium in which persons with short-term commitments to
the neighborhood move toward renting and those with long-term
desires to stay in certain areas move toward homeownership,
condominiums, and cooperatives. Ordinary people can, there-
fore, make the right decisions with respect to how and where to
live without having to battle the constant distortions brought on
by any system of rent stabilization.
Professor Berger's guilty conscience requires him to recog-
nize these nagging distortions, but he then tries to soothe it fur-
ther by showing that two wrongs make a right. After all, he ob-
serves, interest payments are deductible but rent is not; and the
senior citizen's lobby has procured an unprincipled exemption
from taxation of $125,000 in gain as well.24 But Professor Berger
wholly fails to explain why mistakes in the tax laws are cor-
rected by the unrelated interference with rental housing under
stabilization. One silly government subsidy does not justify an-
other. The right response to Professor Berger's long list of mis-
guided programs is a renewed determination to eliminate them
from the law, one and all.
There are three other points by Professor Berger that de-
serve a brief reply. He claims that my system freezes the state
into a single form of ownership known by the common law.25 To
this there are two answers. First, why is it so bad? If voluntary
transactions in rental property are superior to regulation across
the board, then there is ample reason to preserve those institu-
tions on a permanent basis, which only a constitution can do.
Second, the freezing of property relationships is not absolute. In
Takings, I indicate in great detail the ways in which the com-
mon-law interests in real and personal property can be changed
by government regulation, regulation that works to the benefit
of all concerned. 26 In this context, rent stabilization flunks be-
cause even if the landlord is compensated for his losses, the state
24 Id. at 1244.
25 Id. at 1242.
26 R. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, chs. 14-18.
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must finance those payments out of general revenues paid by
ordinary persons who have to subsidize folks with Professor Ber-
ger's tender sensibilities. My view on this point rests on the ar-
gument, surely controversial, that all forms of redistribution
(and surely redistribution to the rich) are beyond the power of
the state to enact. But pass the point by and ask this question:
Even if the state could work the redistribution of wealth if it
pays for it out of general revenues, so that all welfare programs
pass constitutional muster without question, would this program
ever be enacted into law? I doubt it for the simple reason that it
is not worth it. If the public does not want to pay for benefits for
a select few of its members, why then should it be able to vote
them into place without paying a nickel from public coffers?
Professor Berger also repeats the common argument that
rent stabilization is fine because the current owner has pur-
chased with knowledge that the system is in place and takes
subject to its restrictions.27 The fact of knowledge may be true,
but the legal conclusion does not follow. All Professor Berger has
demonstrated is that rent stabilization now imposes large capital
losses on the original owners who were forced to sell subject to a
disability that never should have been imposed in the first place.
At most, Professor Berger has shown that he owes over $100,000
to the former owner of his building, not his present one. Even
that figleaf could be totally removed if the contract for the sale
of a building had transferred to the purchaser all rights to chal-
lenge rent stabilization that were held by the predecessor in ti-
tle. In any event, Berger's point is overbroad. The fact that the
purchase was made with knowledge would justify any system of
regulation given a transferee, even one that does not provide a
reasonable rate of return on the original investment, which Pro-
fessor Berger seems to think is required under the Constitution,
although he never quite says why.28 But we could avoid all these
questions of who has a legitimate grievance against state regula-
tion if we strike it all down in the first place. Professor Berger's
$100,000 windfall is ill-gotten gain, and deep-down I dare say
that we both know it.
Mr. Dobkin uses an amalgam of history, economics, and
philosophy to attack my conclusions, but he misses the boat on
27 Berger, supra note 21, at 1243.
28 Id. at 1246.
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all counts. His initial points are historical. He begins with a
description of conditions in New York as described by Jacob
Riis, and treats that as an attack on market principles.2 Yet he
never asks two critical questions about his data. First, were
there other types of housing market regulation that could ac-
count for the dislocations that he observed? And second, how
great were the dislocations? This last question is not trivial. The
weakness in Riis's expose is that it never asks about the condi-
tions that the residents of the New York tenements escaped.
The bet here is that life in the Polish and Russian ghettos was
far worse in every way than life in the tenements, especially in
the long run. After all, millions of people, including my grand-
parents, voted with their feet. Indeed, the ability of the New
York housing system to absorb that enormous influx is itself tes-
timony to the level of enterprise that must have taken place,
with or without regulation. We should expect many short-term
dislocations when there are huge increases in demand for hous-
ing. Dobkin does not tell us how rent control would solve the
problem. But we do know the answer. It would have done its
part to keep immigrants out of this country - to perish in the
pogroms of Russia or the concentration camps of Germany.
Similarly, Dobkin misunderstands the historical record
when he points to the massive stresses on the housing system
that preceded rent control and, thus, could not be attributed to
it.30 His historical point is, of course, correct, but it only shows
that there can be many ills in the world, not that rent control or
rent stabilization is a sound set of social policies. Thus, the dis-
locations of the 1930s were attributable in large measure to the
large (35 percent) deflation that was introduced first by Hoover
(a statist president) and maintained by Roosevelt. Any deflation
is an implicit transfer of wealth from the debtor to the creditor,
since debts denominated in constant dollars only get larger. The
effect is systematic foreclosure as farmers and others are unable
to pay their debts. But mortgage moratoria, the analogy to rent
control, are hardly the answers to this problem, given that the
banks themselves have obligations to their own depositors that
cannot be honored if their source of funds is cut off. The only
29 Dobkin, Confiscating Reality: The Illusion of Controls in the Big Apple, 54
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1249, 1251-53 (1989).
30 Id. at 1252-53.
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answer is to reinflate the currency to its former level so as to
nullify the implicit transfer that the original deflation brought
on. Other gimmicks only make things worse.
To describe the dislocations of the 1930s as a failure of mar-
kets is therefore wrong on two counts. First, it attributes to mar-
ket forces the changes in the real value of money when that
function is within the exclusive control of the federal govern-
ment, which controls the money supply. Second, it cannot ex-
plain why the dislocation took place in the 1930s but not in the
deflation-free 1920s since mortgage markets were unregulated in
both periods.31
Dobkin's lack of understanding of the history is matched by
his failure to understand what went wrong with the partial re-
form efforts in the New York housing market in the years since
the phasing out of the old system of rent control in 1969. Rent
stabilization attempts to set rentals by looking solely at histori-
cal costs, and, hence, ignores any shifts in demand for housing.
The costs of operating an apartment may increase only 10 per-
cent a year, but the market rentals may move by 50 percent if
demand should surge as neighborhoods become fashionable. The
accumulated difference between market movements and cost
based increases can become very large, which then allows the
landlord to play the type of games that Dobkin points out exist
with vacancy decontrol. Dobkin would like to examine the land-
lord's profits to block this abuse.2 In so doing, he shows the
misguided regulatory mindset that is the source of New York's
housing problems. If entry were free, then profits would be com-
peted down to a competitive level. Consequently, no one would
have to check the books to see that costs were properly allocated
or that corrections were made for unrealized appreciation in as-
sets purchased long ago.
His lack of systematic knowledge of the behavior of markets
under regulation leads him, like Keating, to misperceive the
source of vicious and petty intrigue so characteristic of New
York rental markets. The lag between regulated and market
rents is so great that under any system of vacancy decontrol the
landlord will fabricate any charge to throw the tenant on the
street: that is exactly the result predicted by the economic the-
31 See Dobkin, supra note 29, at 1253.
32 Id. at 1263.
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ory that Dobkin so deplores. That form of bitter class warfare
does not happen in Chicago, and it's not because Chicago land-
lords are so benevolent. The explanation is not transactional,
but structural. In Chicago, the gap between market and regula-
tion does not exist, so the eviction game is not worth playing.
Dobkin would be better off to direct his outrage at the system he
supports than to condemn the landlords for being as selfish and
as sneaky as, say, tenants.
The maximum base rent system is also denounced by Dob-
kin, and rightly so. It involves at the very least a complex ad-
ministrative apparatus to determine which costs should be
passed on to the tenant. The calculations can never be worked
out with precision. Even if they were, the system would fail for
the same reason that stabilization cannot work: the base rent
system is cost driven and does not take into account the shifts in
rentals attributable to changes in demand. None of those
problems would have existed if there had been a system of total
decontrol coupled with free entry into the rental market.
Mr. Dobkin similarly does not understand the economic ex-
planation for other practices that he deplores. He notes, for ex-
ample, that Harry Helmsley and Donald Trump are currently
hoarding apartments. But again he never asks why that same
practice does not occur in cities without government controls of
one sort or another.3 In an ordinary market, the landlord loses
rental income when he keeps property off the market, so there
must be some powerful inducement to hoard units. It may well
be, for example, that Helmsley and Trump might want to sell
these units but could not do so under current law without ob-
taining (for a hefty price) the consent of their tenants. Better to
hold the property idle than to risk the inability to evict a tenant
entrenched in possession by state law. If one could draft a valid
lease that allowed eviction on resale, then the property could be
put to interim use, and the homeless housed. But that option is
foreclosed in New York where regulations, by reducing the total
stock of available rental housing, hurt the very people they are
said to benefit.
Dobkin also notes that rental leases are loaded with all sorts
of clauses that work for the benefit of the landlord and treats
" See id. at 1262.
[Vol. 54: 1281
HeinOnline  -- 54 Brook. L. Rev.  1298 1988-1989
RENT CONTROL REVISITED
that as a sign that there is no consumer freedom in a market
dominated by the landlords.3 4 But again, some of the conces-
sions that a landlord obtains are doubtless an effort to escape
the system of price controls that are imposed from without. If
the stated rental is below market, then tenants can offer no fi-
nancial concessions since they are not allowed simply to bid up
the price. The cost of the system of regulation, therefore, is to
induce people to enter into inefficient agreements. But the cure
is not to denounce landlords; it is to remove the restrictions that
prevent rentals from rising to market levels.
Mr. Dobkin tries to lend an aura of respectability to his
confused musings by relying extensively on Morris Raphael Co-
hen's writings of years ago. 5 But the issue here is not whether
there are limitations on private property: my position expressly
takes the police power into account. The question is whether
these limitations should reach the set of regulations of the sort
found in New York. Here we need to leave philosophy and look
more closely to see how self-interested people respond to various
forms of regulation, an issue that Cohen never explored. Mr.
Dobkin confesses that he is not an economist, which is evident
enough, but mistakenly thinks that he knows obvious truths
that economists do not understand. In so doing he proves anew
that precepts without concepts are indeed blind. Dobkin is a
grizzled street veteran of too many bruising battles between
landlord and tenant. His lack of theory and his lack of distance
means that he cannot understand that the system of regulation
is the villain, even though he recognizes that every regulatory
system he describes is a failure. Some people never learn.
III. THE ECONOMISTS
Professors Mandel3" and Cirace37 each in his own way offers
a qualified defense of rent stabilization as distinguished from a
fixed rent control system. Both writers recognize that the argu-
ments I make against rent control parallel those that are found
1 Id. at 1260.
3' Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1927).
6 Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants? A Reply to Epstein, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1267 (1989).
37 Cirace, Housing Market Instability and Rent Stabilization, 54 BROoKLYN L. REV.
1275 (1989).
1989]
HeinOnline  -- 54 Brook. L. Rev.  1299 1988-1989
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
in standard economics texts. But both dismiss these arguments
as irrelevant, or at least indecisive, in the context of rent stabili-
zation, which exempts certain forms of new construction from
controls and which authorizes routine increases for the landlords
to take into account the increased costs of maintenance of their
premises.
So far so good. But the question that both Mandel and
Cirace have to face is, why stop with half the loaf? The argu-
ment to keep new construction unregulated is an explicit incen-
tive argument (and one that was understood as early as the first
rent control statutes enacted during World War I, which ex-
empted new housing). If the incentive arguments are correct
with respect to new housing, why then are they incorrect with
respect to the existing stock of housing, whose sound allocation
also depends upon the proper price signals? Similarly, rent sta-
bilization of existing housing differs from the traditional, rigid
methods of rent control only in that its statutory increases nar-
row the gap between the regulated and the market rent. As this
gap is narrowed, the dislocations of the regulatory system will be
correspondingly reduced, which is again all to the good. Indeed,
if a system of rent stabilization permits 10 percent annual in-
creases when the rental market stays flat, then prices will
quickly be set solely by the market, much as wages are set by
the market when the minimum wage is $3.35 per hour and the
market wage is $5.00 per hour.
In this context, however, Professors Mandel and Cirace face
the same problem that they have above. If reducing the gap be-
tween market and regulated rents is a good thing, then why isn't
eliminating the gap altogether the best thing? And that can be
achieved by repealing rent stabilization. Closing down the appa-
ratus also reduces the public charge of running so cumbersome
and convoluted a system, so that everyone wins from the change.
What then can they offer to justify a system that creates genuine
misallocations of rental housing at positive social costs?
Here Professors Mandel and Cirace take different courses.
For Pr6kessor Mandel the justification for social control lies in
the "externalities" that can be found in unregulated housing
markets. He writes:
Assume that people prefer relatively stable neighbors rather than a
rapid turnover. In a competitive housing market you would not take
the utility of your neighbors into account when deciding whether to
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renew or vacate. Thus, without rent control the rate of turnover may
be too high, so that rent control may in fact move the market toward
economic efficiency. 8
The weakness in the argument lies in the arbitrary nature of
his assumption and his ability to hedge his assessment with the
use of the verb "may." Initially, there is no reason to assume
that people like stable neighborhoods any more than they like
changing ones. It all depends upon who is moving in and who is
moving out. Thus, one argument - if such an argument were
needed - against rent stabilization is that people do not take
into account the decline in the utility of their neighbors when
they decide to stay put. The neighbors would rather see them
move than stay after their children are grown, but the false sig-
nals sent by rent stabilization keeps them wedded to places
where they are not welcome (if it matters to people who might
also move if rent stabilization were repealed). There is, there-
fore, the identical type of externality with rent stabilization as
there is without it.
At the very best, therefore, it is necessary to guess which
externality is stronger before Professor Mandel can begin to
make out his case. My tentative view is that the externality at-
tributable to rent stabilization is probably the stronger. Here is
why. The decision that any person makes about staying or leav-
ing depends upon the mix of private and neighborhood benefits
that he gets from his housing decision. With rent stabilization
there is a heavy bias to stay given the implicit subsidy from the
system. Some people will enjoy a hefty subsidy and others will
enjoy a lesser one. It seems likely that the population who enjoys
that subsidy will grow more heterogeneous over time because
there will be no second sorting as tastes continue to diverge. It
follows that the neighbors will all have a greater variation in
their preferences about the kind of public goods to be provided
for the neighborhood. Neighborhood decisions now will become
more difficult to make over time as the split in residents' tastes
widens. The absence of rent stabilization tends to insure that
people will move on once they no longer have the tastes (or need
or budget) to stay located in the original place. The mobility
should lead to modest homogeneity, which improves the condi-
"8 Mandel, supra note 36, at 1271.
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tions and style of neighborhoods. The externality problem,
therefore, seems to be a little less daunting without rent stabili-
zation than with it.
I allow that this argument is theoretical and may be wrong.
But that is of little comfort to Professor Mandel, who has
missed altogether the relevant externality attributable to rent
stabilization. For what it is worth, I can think of no obvious the-
ory which makes his view of neighborhood effects more plausible
than mine. At best we are left with wash. His position "may" be
true, but by the same token, it "may" be false. It follows that
Professor Mandel has still offered us nothing to justify the allo-
cative distortions and administrative costs that are inseparable
from any system of rent stabilization.
Professor Cirace for his part stresses the smooth pattern of
rent fluctuations that a system of rent stabilization can bring.
He thus provides us with a figure which has three equilibrium
points: El, E2, and E3.19
Rental
Price $ S1  ] $2
D2
D,
P1" . % E
PD2
S, S2 D,
0 A B Number of Dwellings
Figure I (millions)
11 Cirace, supra note 38, at 1276.
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In his view violent distentions in the market could move us from
El to E2 and then back to E3. If the movement between El and
E2 is very large, and the same can be said of the movement from
E2 to E3, then the advantage of rent stabilization is that it can
smooth the flow by taking us from El to E3. (Actually on his
graph El = E3, which looks like a case for rigid rent controls.)
The greater the moves on the first and second legs, the more
powerful the case for rent stabilization.
The difficulties with his argument are twofold. First, it is
highly unlikely that we would observe in a market the violent
external shocks of the type he postulates. Rents in unregulated
towns are generally pretty stable, and the moves that do occur in
the rental markets typically are reflected in the homeownership
market as well, which suggests that they are perceived to be long
term.
The second point quickly follows. Professor Cirace's graph
is drawn ex post, but the decisions for rent stabilization must be
made ex ante. We cannot be sure that just because we have
moved from El to E2, that the second leg of the journey will be
from E2 to E3. If that leg does not take place then the risk of
rent stabilization is that it locks us in at E3 when we are far
better off at a higher rent at E2. Stated more generally, we can-
not make the regulation at the first leg confident of what will
happen at the second leg. The movement in prices impounds all
that we know about the market, and we cannot predict that
markets will act like gravity: what goes up need not come down
again. If rent stabilization could do wonders in some markets, it
will do massive damage in others, namely those in which the de-
mand continues to shift upward far more rapidly than the cost
of running the apartment. At best, Professor Cirace has shown
us that if the government knows more than the market, it can
outperform the market. But when it knows less, it will do worse.
We shall still have all the allocative and administrative distor-
tions of a rent stabilization system.
Both Professors Mandel and Cirace then urge, and I agree,
that rent stabilization is less obnoxious than old-fashioned New
York rent control. But they have not made out anything close to
an affirmative case for its adoption. The externalities identified
by Professor Mandel exist as much under rent stabilization as
they do in its absence, and the ability of rent stabilization to
dampen market swings, as developed by Professor Cirace, de-
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pends upon an assumption that government has greater knowl-
edge of the market than a cast of thousands of private landlords
and tenants. Neither of those assumptions is in my view defensi-
ble. As they fall so does any case for rent stabilization.
CONCLUSION
These short Responses to my Article Rent Control and the
Theory of Efficient Regulation do nothing to soften its basic
conclusion, which is that rent control and rent stabilization are
per se unconstitutional takings of private property. Nor do they
offer any sound social justification as to why so unfortunate a
state of affairs should be allowed to continue. Again, I stress
that the arguments I have made against rent control are not a
brief for landlords, but a brief for a social system of competition
in which the constant pressure of entry restrains landlords to a
competitive rate of return while providing tenants with the qual-
ity of housing that gives them the most for their money. I con-
fess that I still believe that this is a very modest and very desira-
ble social program indeed. But it will be a difficult one to
implement given the high level of intellectual confusion and
vested special interests that stand in the path of its adoption.
That much, at least, we have learned from these seven
comments.
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